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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PARO LE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Bullard, Joseph Facility: Woodboume CF 
NY SID: 
DIN: 96-A-7722 
Appeal 
Control No.: 10-005-18 B 
Appearances: Jason Sautter Esq. 
23 West Main Street 
Middletown, New York 10940 
Decision appealed: September 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 
months. 
Board Member(s) Coppola, Davis 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received February 26, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: .Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~k======X-:: ~med _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Detennination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the sep~te fin/, dings o,f 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on'5jJiJ:5
1 
~9 16 . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
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Name: Bullard, Joseph DIN: 96-A-7722  
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    Appellant challenges the September 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 18-month hold. Appellant’s instant offense involved him shooting a semi-automatic 
pistol into a crowd, and then pointing it and firing it at a police officer. Appellant raises the 
following issues: 1) the Board decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on 
impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory 
factors. Appellant contends he has an excellent institutional record and release plan, but all the 
Board did was to look only at the instant offense/criminal history. 2) the decision violated his due 
process constitutional liberty interest in a legitimate expectation of early release. 3) the Board 
ignored the wishes of the sentencing court to release him at the minimum term of his sentence, and  
has resentenced him. 4) the decision lacks details. 5) the decision failed to make required findings 
of fact. 6) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the 
COMPAS was mostly ignored. 7) the interview was done in a biased and unfair manner. 8) the 
Executive Law statutes are unconstitutional under the void for vagueness doctrine, as they allow 
unfettered discretion, as well as adverse political pressure and public opinion. 
 
         Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
     That the Board found Appellant’s postconviction activities outweighed by the serious nature of 
his crimes does not constitute convincing evidence that the Board did not consider them, see Matter 
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of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994), or 
render the decision irrational, see Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). 
    There is no requirement in the law that the board place equal or greater emphasis on petitioner's 
commendable conduct than on the gravity of his offense.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 133, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983). The Board was not 
required to give each factor equal weight and could place greater emphasis on the gravity of the 
inmate’s offense.  Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 
2018); Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 
235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of Furman v. Annucci, 138 A.D.3d 1269, 28 N.Y.S.3d 352 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter 
of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). 
    After considering the relevant factors, the Board was allowed to place greater emphasis on the 
inmate’s criminal record including prior failures while under community supervision.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); People ex rel. Herbert v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983).  
    The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
     The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offense and that it was an escalation in illegal 
behavior.  See Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 
N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); Matter of 
Symmonds v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 
N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 
A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).    
     [T]he decision of the board members… to deny petitioner parole because of the serious nature 
of the offense, petitioner’s extensive criminal record, and prior failures at parole supervision, 
including the fact that the instant offense was committed while petitioner was on parole, is 
supported by the record and satisfied the board's obligations under Executive Law § 259-i.  
People ex rel. Yates v. Walters, 111 A.D.2d 839, 839, 490 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (2d Dept. 1985). 
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     The Board may consider the inmates involvement with weapons. Dean v New York State 
Division of Parole,  21 A.D.3d 1207, 801 N.Y.S.2d 92 (3d Dept. 2005). 
     Appellant’s release plans are insufficient. Executive Law 259-i(c)(1) clearly confers discretion 
upon the parole board as to whether and, if release is granted, when to release an inmate. Hodge v 
Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
     The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Bush v. 
Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed 
results including substance abuse relevant given use before crime); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 
148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for 
substance abuse alcohol related crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family 
support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).   
     That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
as “contrary to the best interest of the community”).   
      The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
    Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
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set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
   That the sentencing court did not impose the maximum sentence is not an indication that the 
sentencing court made a favorable parole recommendation. Duffy v New York State Division of 
Parole, 74 A.D.3d 965, 903 N.Y.S.2d 479 (2d  Dept.  2010). The minimum term of imprisonment in 
a plea agreement is not tantamount to a sentencing recommendation-and a parole denial does not 
thus constitute a re-sentencing. Gomez v New York State Division of Parole,  87 A.D.3d 1197, 929 
N.Y.S.2d 338 (3d Dept. 2011)  lv.app.den.  18 N.Y.3d 802, 938 N.Y.S.2d 860 (2011). 
     An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
     That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest 
in parole release.  Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); 
Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 
(3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). 
     Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
     Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason 
and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in 
reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is 
neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  
Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Bullard, Joseph DIN: 96-A-7722  
Facility: Woodbourne CF AC No.:  10-005-18 B 
    
Findings: (Page 5 of 6) 
 
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
     In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
    There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-
finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 
2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 
957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal 
policies in fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 
(2000).  There must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision 
flowed from such bias.  Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d 
Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (rejecting bias claim); Matter of 
Grune v. Board of Parole,41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007). No such evidence 
exists here.  
     Executive Law § 259-i is constitutional.  MacKenzie v. Cunningham, No. 12-CV-2452 
NSR PED, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2014) (rejecting void for vagueness challenges); 
Matter of MacKenzie v. Evans, 95 A.D.3d 1613, 945 N.Y.S.2d 471 (3d Dept. 2012) (same); Matter 
of Linares v. Stanford, Index # 1637/2016, Decision & Judgment dated 12/3/16 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess 
Co.) (Pagones A.S.C.J.) (same); West v. Alexander, No. 07-CV-2098 ARR/LB, 2009 WL 
5172960, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009) (noting void for vagueness challenge dismissed by prior 
order); see also Matter of Lue-Shing v. Pataki, 301 A.D.2d 827, 754 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (3d Dept. 
2003); Matter of Felder v. Travis, 278 A.D.2d 570, 717 N.Y.S.2d 683 (3d  Dept. 2000); Matter of 
Jerrell v. Ibsen, 253 A.D.2d 917, 677 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 1998). A vagueness challenge 
may be maintained only when no set of circumstances exists under which the law would be valid 
or in the presence of a constitutionally protected right. Dickerson v Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 743-
45 (2d Cir. 2010); City of Chicago v Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999); U.S. v Salerno, 481 U.S. 
739, 745 (1987). A vagueness challenge fails if the statute contains sufficient standards to afford 
a reasonable degree of certainty so that a person of ordinary intelligence is not forced to guess at 
its meaning and to safeguard against arbitrary enforcement. Morrissey v Apostol, 75 A.D.3d 993, 
996 (3d Dept. 2010). 
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    The fact that Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)does not specify how much weight is to be accorded 
to each enumerated factor does not make the law unconstitutional. Jerrell v Ibsen, 253 A.D.2d 917, 
677 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept 1998). Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole 
Board to specify the particular evidence on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate 
is not ready for conditional release. Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). 
There is no due process requirement that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v 
Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975). The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s 
balancing of the statutory criteria, and which is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v 
Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). In response to being told the New York State Parole Board is stringent and lacks 
standards, the Court held there is no reason to anticipate that the petitioners will be denied a 
constitutionally proper parole hearing. Carmona v Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 414 (2d Cir. 1978) cert. 
denied 439 U.S. 1091, 99 S.Ct. 874, 59 L.Ed.2d 58  (1979). 
    Appellant’s claim of political pressure is purely speculative and unsubstantiated.  Matter of 
MacKenzie v. Evans, 95 A.D.3d 1613, 1614, 945 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 
815, 955 N.Y.S.2d 553 (2012); Matter of Huber v. Travis, 264 A.D.2d, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 
1999);  Krebs v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No. 9:08-CV-255NAMDEP, 2009 WL 2567779, at *12 
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009) (public and political pressure “are permissible factors which parole 
officials may properly consider as they relate to ‘whether ‘release is not incompatible with the 
welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of the offense as to undermine respect 
for the law’”); Seltzer v. Thomas, No. 03 CIV.00931 LTS FM, 2003 WL 21744084, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003) (same); Morel v. Thomas, No. 02 CV 9622 (HB), 2003 WL 21488017, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2003); Siao-Pao v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 244-45 (S.D.N.Y 2008).  
Additionally, the public and members of the government have First Amendment rights to urge 
specific government actions. Calififornia Motor Transport Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 
510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed2d 642 (1972).    
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
